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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the Internet has provided new options for individuals
suffering from debilitating infirmities to enjoy their lives independently.
Much of this has come from online commerce, such as Web sites, like
Amazon.com, that sell products or services to people without them ever
needing to leave home. However, games like Second Life and World of
Warcraft have gone further, creating virtual worlds in which individuals,
disabled or not, may enjoy virtual lives, sharing experiences, forming
friendships, and starting businesses. For disabled individuals, virtual worlds
may mean a life less hindered by physical disability and social interactions
without stigma, increasing self-worth and independence.
However, individuals with severely impaired vision, hearing, or motor
abilities may not be able to enjoy the benefits provided by virtual worlds.
Since virtual worlds are primarily conveyed through visual media, "low
vision" or blind users may find life in these virtual worlds even more
prohibitive than their real lives. If not subtitled, conversation in virtual
worlds may be impossible, even to those able to read lips. Those lacking
the motor or visual capacity to use a mouse effectively can be handicapped
if mouse inputs are the only means of interacting with the world.
To remedy these problems, disabled individuals must rely on
accessibility functions and settings in virtual-world programs, or third-party
software and hardware, to be able to play or "live" in these virtual worlds.
However, providing access to impaired individuals is entirely voluntary for
virtual-world developers and is thus inconsistent among these games.
Third-party software and hardware may be incompatible with some games,
blocked by others as "cheats" that provide users with an unfair advantage,
or may be prohibitively expensive.
Developments in disability-law jurisprudence, such as the recent
settlement in National Federation of the Blind v. Target Corp. have
provided hope for some in the disability advocacy community that the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) may be applied to these virtual
worlds.' The Target case was the first action applying the ADA to a Web
site that survived a motion to dismiss. 2 The plaintiffs were blind individuals
who claimed Target's retail Web site discriminated against them by not
accommodating the screen-reading software they use to view Web sites. If
such suits become more prevalent, then disability advocates hope that Web
sites and Internet service providers (ISPs) may soon be forced by law to
1. See Posting of Benjamin Duranske to Virtually Blind,




provide reasonable accessibility measures to their Web sites. If the ADA is
applicable to Web sites, then, by extension, it may be applicable to online
virtual worlds. Alternatively, even if the ADA is not applicable to Web
sites, disability advocates hope that features of virtual worlds analogous to
the real world may provide stronger arguments for the application of the
ADA to virtual worlds.3
Such optimism may be premature, however, as the decision to hear
the case was more of a reflection of the current circuit split over whether
"places of public accommodation" under the ADA should include "places"
other than physical structures. Moreover, while some features of online
virtual worlds make application of the ADA to virtual worlds more
apposite than to Web sites, other features, such as their nature as products
themselves, may exempt virtual worlds from the requirements of the ADA.
If advocates wish to succeed in applying the ADA to virtual worlds, courts
will need to be educated about the prevalence and future of online
commerce, and persuaded that application of the ADA to virtual worlds is
possible as the ADA is currently written.
This Note attempts to distinguish virtual worlds from Web sites and
discusses the potential for overcoming the circuit split by suggesting
application of the ADA to virtual worlds independent of its application to
Web sites. Section II of this Note discusses virtual worlds and their
relevance to people with disabilities. Section III outlines Title III of the
ADA and discusses the historical and current split in the federal circuits
over the ADA's definition of "places of public accommodation" under
Title III. Section IV discusses problems with the application of Title HI to
virtual worlds and suggests new arguments for its application to virtual
worlds. Section V concludes by arguing from the material presented that
courts should adopt an interpretation of Title III that looks to the character
of a place instead of its physicality.
II. VIRTUAL WORLDS, VIRTUAL LIVES
Web sites offer access to a multitude of products and services, vast
amounts of information, and a global connection unimagined prior to the
invention of the World Wide Web. However, Web sites are not immersive
and, thus, often provide little experience to the user beyond sitting at a desk
in front of a computer. Unlike Web sites, most virtual worlds do not offer
products or services, but are often products themselves.4 Also, unlike Web
sites, the experiences virtual worlds provide are immersive and, as a result,
virtual worlds can provide virtual lives.
3. See id.
4. See, e.g., infra Part IV.
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A. Characteristics of Virtual Worlds
Virtual worlds are essentially computer games or software that allow
the player or user to view and interact with others over the Internet in a
persistent three-dimensional environment.
Some of these worlds may be true to life, representing a suburban
neighborhood or an East Coast metropolis, or they may be fantastic,
representing a medieval kingdom or a planet in a faraway galaxy. Some
worlds, like Second Life, provide the opportunity to experience a multitude
of virtual landscapes in a single program.
In these virtual worlds, the user is represented by an "avatar," a three-
dimensional model that inhabits the world and accepts and follows
commands inputted by the user.5 The user is able to personalize an avatar,
providing a greater connection to his or her virtual representative. Users
interact with the world and with other users through these avatars, and may
often communicate through text, voice, or gestures.
The bond between a user and avatar can be very intimate and
personal, so personal that he or she may actually feel the actions that the
avatar has been commanded to perform. Mark Dubin, a neuroscientist and
former University of Colorado professor, explained this phenomenon,
stating, "[y]ou have a representative that is you and responds to you. You
move, it moves. You feel like you're there. Literally your brain will show
activity typical of what the avatar is doing." 6 Dubin's explanation has some
anecdotal support as well.7 For instance, users of Second Life have gone so
far as to create a "virtual ability island," where people with disabilities may
perform therapeutic activities that help them overcome difficulties in their
real lives.8
The persistence of virtual worlds-virtual-world programs continue to
run with or without users, allowing them to store data about users'
locations, attributes, inventories, and so on9-- creates a continuity not only
to the virtual world, but also to its virtual inhabitants. As a result of this
continuity, users may develop entirely new online personas within the
virtual world that change as they change. Indeed, a significant number of
virtual-world users prefer their virtual life to their real life.'
5. Kevin W. Saunders, Virtual Worlds-Real Courts, 52 VILL. L. REV. 187, 190
(2007).
6. Shelley Schendler, Second Life Frees Disabled from Restrictions of Everyday Life,
Voice of America, Sept. 17, 2008, available at http://www.voanews.com/
english/archive/2008-09/2008-09-17-voa24.cfin.
7. See id.
8. See Duranske, supra note 1; Virtual Ability Home Page, http://virtualability.org/
default.aspx (last visited Dec. 10, 2009).
9. Saunders, supra note 5, at 191.
10. Id. at 191-92.
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Moreover, as a result of the continuity and persistence of these
avatars, users can develop real, lasting relationships with other users within
the game. The authenticity of these relationships can be demonstrated by
the extravagant virtual-world weddings between virtual inhabitants that
replace real-world ceremonies," and the real divorces that result from
virtual infidelities.'
2
B. Virtual Worlds 'Benefits to People with Disabilities
The benefits of virtual worlds to the disabled are immense. As
previously mentioned, the bond a virtual-world user shares with his or her
avatar creates a vicarious motility, so he or she actually feels like acts are
being performed through the avatar. Because of this vicarious motility,
virtual worlds provide an alternative means for social interaction that
closely mimics the real world.
This alternative interaction grants a social life to people who would
otherwise be bound to their home or their bed. In virtual worlds, people
with physical disabilities may go out dancing, rock climbing, or fight in the
prince's army. Alternatively, they can play games with other people, as
superheroes in a super-powered team, or join a raiding party fighting
goblins on the outskirts of a virtual town. Second Life even trades virtual
currency with real-world currency on a virtual exchange, sells virtual real
estate, and allows its users to keep intellectual property rights in virtual
property they create in the game.' 3 This level of interactivity and
persistence allows people with disabilities to start successful businesses
making thousands of real dollars a year, allowing them greater
independence and increasing self-worth.'
4
Moreover, a homogeneous appearance of capability among avatars
removes or mitigates the stigma of disability from interpersonal relations. 5
The form of one's avatar may or may not be limited by the game; some
developers provide model templates and a limited number of
personalization options, while others provide merely a basic shape and
allow tech-savvy users to create their own models and textures, their
11. See CNN, Virtual World, Real Emotions: Relationships in Second Life, Dec. 15,
2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/LIVING/12/12/second.life.relationship.irpt/index.html (last
visited Dec. 10, 2009).
12. See CNN, Second Life Affair Ends in Divorce, Nov. 14, 2008,
http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/europe/1 1/14/second.life.divorce/index.html (last
visited Dec. 10, 2009).
13. Steven J. Davidson, An Immersive Perspective on the Second Life Virtual World,
947 PLI/PAT 673, 681 (2008).
14. Steve Mollman, Online a Virtual Business Option for Disabled, CNN, July 10,
2007, http://edition.cnn.com/2007/BUSINESS/07/10/virtual.disabled/index.html (last visited
Dec. 10, 2009).
15. Schendler, supra note 6.
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appearance limited only by their imaginations. 16 Regardless of limitations,
the result is the same: users cannot easily discern whether the user behind
the avatar is disabled. Because the user appears no different from other
users, the user is treated no differently. Being treated as an equal to one's
peers increases self-worth.
C. Virtual Worlds' Obstacles for People with Disabilities
The positive effects of virtual life are not uniformly available,
however, as visual, aural, and physical disabilities limit access to many
options in virtual worlds. Though complete blindness is a near
insurmountable obstacle, as the immersiveness 17 of current virtual worlds is
largely contingent upon visual cues and perspective, people with "low
vision" may still benefit if given the opportunity. Low vision is not a
complete inability to see-included are people with uncorrectable near- or
far-sightedness, colorblindness, or partial blindness-but rather a limitation
on one's vision that creates a difficulty perceiving "content that is small,
does not enlarge well, or which does not have sufficient contrast.' 8 If
virtual-world textures and models blend together due to muted colors or
lack of contrast, or virtual-world text is insufficiently large or distinctive in
color, a user may be unable to function effectively in the virtual world.' 9
Similarly, when a mouse is required for interaction within the world
(without the option of keyboard-based alternatives), access to virtual
16. For example, World of Warcraft features ten playable races with nine playable
classes that affect the appearance (and abilities) of an avatar. See World of Warcraft Race
Information, http://www.worldofwarcraft.com/info/races/index.html (last visited Dec. 10,
2009). Each avatar has cosmetic features, such as gender, face, hair color and style, and
skin color, which may be chosen from a limited number of options, though changing these
features after initially choosing them costs $15. See Blizzard Support, World of Warcraft
Character Recustomization FAQ, http://us.blizzard.com/support/article.xml?locale
=enUS&tag--CRCFAQ (last visted Dec. 10, 2009). Second Life, on the other hand, allows
users to create, buy and sell textures that change the clothing and appearance of their
avatars, boasting that "[t]he only limit is your imagination." See Second Life Avatars,
http://secondlife.com/whatis/avatar/?lang--en-US (last visited Dec. 10, 2009). These
attributes may be changed drastically, and at any time. See Jonathan Strickland & David
Roos, How Second Life Works, HOwSTUFFWORKS.COM,
http://computer.howstuffworks.com/intemet/social-networking/networks/second-life2.htm
(last visited Dec. 10, 2009).
17. The New Oxford American Dictionary defines "immersive" as "(of a computer
display or system) generating a three-dimensional image that appears to surround the user."
THENEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 850 (2001).
18. Nikki D. Kessling, Note, Why the Target "Nexus Test" Leaves Disabled Americans
Disconnected: A Better Approach to Determine Whether Private Commercial Websites Are
"Places of Public Accommodation", 45 Hous. L. REv. 991, 999 (2008) (quoting Web
Accessibility in Mind, Visual Disabilities-Low Vision,




worlds may be prohibitively difficult for those users unable to see a cursor
on the screen.
2 °
Aural disabilities, such as partial or total deafness, do not present
obstacles as great as visual disabilities to the virtual-world experience.
However, the sole use of auditory cues or vocal conversation can lead deaf
users to miss out on necessary elements of in-game stories, or exclude them
entirely from virtual-world discussions.21
Physical and motor disabilities ranging from severe carpal tunnel
syndrome to partial paralysis may also limit users' access within virtual
worlds. A virtual-world program's over-reliance on either keyboards or
computer mouses may exclude those unable to use one or the other device.
For those that have limited use of either type of device, objects that are
very small or very dynamic can present difficulty.
22
D. Options to Overcome the Obstacles
Obstacles due to visual, aural, and physical disabilities are very real
and, under current law, developers are under no legal obligation to provide
options to disabled gainers. However, some developers, like Mythic
Entertainment discussed below, voluntarily provide accessibility options,
often due to coaxing from disability advocates. Such advocacy has had
varied success and can take a great deal of time.
For example, AbleGamers, an online community for disabled gainers,
reported somewhat different experiences contacting the makers of two very
stylistically similar virtual-world games, World of Warcraft and
Warhammer Online, in regard to each game's accessibility to disabled
gainers.23 Mythic Entertainment, the creator of Warhammer Online, offered
several optional settings which significantly increased the game's
accessibility to visually and physically impaired people.24 AbleGamers,
impressed with Mythic's seeming dedication to disabled gainers, sought to
recognize the company as the "Most Accessible Mainstream Game" of
2008, but did not do so without first securing support from Mythic for On-
Screen Keyboard. 25 On-Screen Keyboard is a mousable interface allowing
20. Id, at 1000.




23. See Annette Gonzalez, AbleGamers Gives WarHammer "Most Accessible
Mainstream Game" of 2008, ABLEGAMERS.COM, Feb. 2, 2009,
http://www.ablegamers.com/game-news/415-ablegamers-gives-warhammer-game-of-
2008.html; A Dwarf Priest, supra note 21.
24. Gonzalez, supra note 24.
25. Id.
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users to type data on their screen by clicking 26-a useful tool for garners
unable to manage a keyboard. AbleGamers appealed to Mythic and
convinced them the request "was not just an additional feature request, but
a real need., 27 Within months, Mythic implemented a patch to make the
game compatible with the On-Screen Keyboard and subsequently received
the recognition from AbleGamers.28
In contrast, AbleGamers claimed it took three years for Blizzard
Entertainment, maker of World of Warcraft, to respond to their e-mails and
requests to make World of Warcraft compatible with third-party
accessibility software.29 What ultimately spurred Blizzard to act was a
threat to publicize Blizzard's lack of response on t-shirts at a game
developers' conference. 30 Blizzard claimed its hesitancy was due to
concerns about third-party accessibility software providing opportunities to
cheat.31 Accessibility software often allows for automation of certain
functions so that disabled players, unable to quickly enter several
commands, may achieve an even playing field with other players.32
According to J. Allen Brack, Lead Producer for Blizzard, "[t]here are
several reasons [other than automation] why certain functions are not
permitted in [third-party software]. First and foremost, we forbid any
functionality that could lead to cheating or that violate [sic] our Terms of
Use. 33
Blizzard's statement about such software highlights one obstacle
disability advocates face when attempting to garner increased support for
accessibility options and third-party software: game balance. Developers
must strike a balance between providing access to disabled players and
preventing abuse of accessibility software by players who do not need it.
However, despite the worries expressed by Blizzard, AbleGamers
reported of Warhammer Online that:
[N]o matter what your general disability is, this game may have the
ability to accommodate you. We have found that game pads work




29. A DwARF PRIEST, supra note 21.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., A Dwarf Priest, supra note 21 (discussing the "struggle of balancing game




third party programs such as voice commands, sip and puff, and other
input devices work with 100% proficiency.
34
The accessibility of Warhammer Online demonstrates that the
reluctance to provide accessibility may be a product of an overabundance
of caution, if not a lack of proper motivation. Moreover, despite
accessibility functionality voluntarily implemented in virtual-world
programs, updates in technology stand to undermine, or at least make more
difficult, efforts to keep virtual worlds accessible. For example, a switch
from text-based communication to voice-based communication in a virtual
world diminishes deaf users' capability to participate, though such a change
may be preferable to the majority of players. In Second Life, the move
toward voice communication has sparked controversy.35 In order to
properly motivate developers to maintain accessibility functionality, virtual
worlds may need to be regulated and, if so, Title III of the Americans with
Disabilities Act provides an attractive option.
III. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND THE
INTERNET
Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act reads, in relevant part:
"No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in
the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by
any person who owns, leases . . . , or operates a place of public
accommodation. 36 Thus, whether the provisions of Title III can be applied
has most often hinged on whether a business, company, or service provider
fits the statutory definition of a "place of public accommodation." The
statute defines "place of public accommodation" as any of the following
private entities that affect commerce:
(A) an inn, hotel, motel, or other place of lodging...;
(B) a restaurant, bar, or other establishment serving food or drink;
(C) a motion picture house, theater, concert hall, stadium, or other
place of exhibition or entertainment;
(D) an auditorium, convention center, lecture hall, or other place of
public gathering;
(E) a bakery, grocery store, clothing store, hardware store, shopping
center, or other sales or rental establishment;
34. Id. (quoting Steve Spohn, Warhammer: Age of Accessibility, ABLEGAMERs.cOm,
Aug. 27, 2008, http://www.ablegamers.com/game-news/332-warhammer-age-of-
accessibility.html).
35. Posting of Martin Oliver to Learning from Social Worlds,
http://Iearningfromsocialworlds.wordpress.com/exclusion-community-in-second-life/ (Nov.
2007).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2006).
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(F) a laundromat, dry-cleaner, bank, barber shop, beauty shop, travel
service, shoe repair service, funeral parlor, gas station, office of an
accountant or lawyer, pharmacy, insurance office, professional office
of a health care provider, hospital, or other service establishment;
(G) a terminal, depot, or other station used for specified public
transportation;
(H) a museum, library, gallery, or other place of public display or
collection;
(I) a park, zoo, amusement park, or other place of recreation;
(J) a nursery, elementary, secondary, undergraduate, or postgraduate
private school, or other place of education;
(K) a day care center, senior citizen center, homeless shelter, food
bank, adoption agency, or other social service center establishment;
and
(L) a gymnasium, health spa, bowling alley, golf course, or other place
of exercise or recreation. 3F
While most of the enumerated places of public accommodation
arguably have a concrete character, the vagueness in each categories'
inclusion of "or other [place or establishment]"-and particularly the
inclusion of "travel service" in (F)-has resulted in a circuit split as courts
attempt to construe the statute as either inclusive or exclusive of
commercial entities not housed within brick-and-mortar facilities, but
which nonetheless deny disabled individuals access to their products or
services. However, the circuits seem to agree that it is not the products or
services provided by the place of public accommodation, but the access to
those products and services that brings an entity under the ambit of Title
III. Therein lies the difficulty for virtual worlds, most of which are products
or services not included within any enumerated category.
A. The First, Second, and Seventh Circuits: Places of Public
Accommodation Need not Be Physical Structures
The First Circuit held in its 1994 decision in Carparts Distribution
Center, Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler's Ass 'n of New England that places
of public accommodation did not need to be brick-and-mortar buildings,
and that any company which provided services listed in the definition
provided by the statute could be a "place of public accommodation.
38
Much of the First Circuit's decision was based on the appearance of "travel
service" in the definition.39 The court found that the plain meaning of the
terms included in the definition did not require public accommodations to
37. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (2006).





have physical structures.4 ° Since many service establishments do not
require a physical structure, and instead conduct business by telephone or
mail, the court found that "[i]t would be irrational to conclude that persons
who enter an office to purchase services are protected by the ADA, but
persons who purchase the same services over the telephone or by mail are
not."'
The First Circuit left open the question of whether the provisions of
Title III were intended to provide only access to a product or service, or
were "intended in addition to shape and control which products and
services may be offered.*42 To that end, Title III does offer that reasonable
modifications must be made to provide access to goods and services to
individuals with disabilities "unless the entity can demonstrate that taking
such steps would fundamentally alter the nature" of such goods or
services.43
Later decisions in the Second and Seventh Circuits follow the
precedent set by the First Circuit in Carparts.44 Notably, the Seventh
Circuit, in Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co., interpreted Carparts in
dicta to state that
[t]he core meaning of [Title III] ... is that the owner or operator of a
store, hotel, restaurant, dentist's office, travel agency, theater, Web site,
or other facility (whether in physical space or in electronic space ...
that is open to the public cannot exclude disabled persons.45
Similar to the First Circuit, the Seventh Circuit distinguished between
requiring places of public accommodation to provide people with
disabilities access to their products or services, and requiring places to
fundamentally alter their products or services to accommodate people with
disabilities.46
B. The Third, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits: The Nexus Test
In contrast to the First and Seventh Circuits, there is a consensus
among the Third, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits that places of public
accommodation must be concrete, physical structures. In the Sixth Circuit's
1995 opinion in Stoutenborough v. National Football League, Inc., the
plaintiffs sued the National Football League (NFL) and several television




43. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii) (2006).
44. See Pallozzi v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 198 F.3d 28, 32-33 (2nd Cir. 2000); Doe v.
Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557, 559 (7th Cir. 1999).
45. Mutual of Omaha, 179 F.3d at 559 (emphasis added).
46. Id. at 560.
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accommodation. 47 The plaintiffs' claim centered on the NFL's "blackout
rule" which prohibited local television broadcasts of home games if the
stadium was not sold out three days before the game.48 The plaintiffs
alleged that the blackout rule discriminated against hearing-impaired
individuals, preventing them from enjoying a game that hearing individuals
could enjoy via radio broadcast.49 The court held that the blackout rule
prevented television viewing of football games by both hearing and
hearing-impaired people alike and, thus, could not be discriminatory.50
Moreover, the court held that radio broadcasts did not fall under the ambit
of the blackout rule and, thus, the availability of the radio broadcasts was
irrelevant. 5
Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit agreed with the defendant companies
that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim, as none of the defendant
companies were "places of public accommodation," defining a "place" as a
"facility" which regulations define as "all or any portion of buildings,
structures, sites, complexes, equipment, rolling stock or other conveyances,
roads, walks, passageways, parking lots, or other real or personal property,
including the site where the building, property, structure, or equipment is
located. 52 Though the court reasoned that the televised broadcast of the
football games was a service, the definition of "place" as concrete and
physical kept the NFL and television stations from the reach of the
statute.53 Additionally, though the court found that games were played in
stadiums, which are places of public accommodation, the televised
broadcast of the game was not a service of the stadium but rather of the
NFL, and "[i]t is all of the services which the public accommodation offers,
not all services which the lessor of the public accommodation offers which
fall within the scope of Title 1l."
54
The Sixth Circuit reaffirmed its definition of "place of public
accommodation" as a physical, concrete structure in Parker v. Metropolitan
Life Insurance Co.55 In Parker, the court denied application of Title HI to a
disability insurance policy offered to businesses.56 The defendant had sold
the plaintiff's employer long-term disability insurance, and the plaintiff
brought suit, alleging that the insurance policy violated the provisions of





52. Id. at 583 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (2008)).
53. Id.
54. Id. (emphasis added).
55. Parker v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1010-11 (6th Cir. 1997).
56. Id. at 1008.
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Title III by offering differing benefits contingent upon whether the person's
disability was mental or physical. 7 While the court agreed that Title III
specifically barred the provision of disparate benefits by a place of public
accommodation, and that insurance policies fall under the purview of
products and services under Title III, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district
court's grant of summary judgment against the plaintiff.5 8 The court
reasoned that, in order to apply Title III's provisions to a product or
service, even if discriminatory, there must be a "nexus" between the
product or service and a place of public accommodation.59 Since the
plaintiff did not access the policy from the defendant's insurance office, but
rather through her employer, there was no "nexus" between a place of
public accommodation and discriminatory benefits, despite Title III
expressly providing that insurance companies are places of public
accommodation.6 °
The "nexus" language was repeated in the Third Circuit's opinion in
Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp. to deny a similar plaintiff seeking to apply
Title III to an employer's disability insurance package through MetLife.61
Since the plaintiff had received her disability insurance as a benefit of her
employment and not directly from MetLife, the court found no "nexus"
with MetLife's insurance office.62 The Ninth Circuit similarly quoted the
"nexus" language in its decision in Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film
Corp., agreeing with the Third and Sixth Circuits.63
The Eleventh Circuit first ratified the "nexus" test in dicta in Rendon
v. Valleycrest Productions, Ltd.64 The plaintiff in Rendon sued the
producers of "Who Wants to Be a Millionaire," a televised quiz show,
alleging that the telephone screening process for contestants discriminated
against the hearing- and mobility-impaired, who could either not hear the
questions being asked of them or could not press the buttons on their phone
quickly enough to record their answers.65 The district court dismissed the
claim, concluding that, since the automated telephone service was not
conducted at a physical location defined by the statute, it was not a place of
public accommodation subject to Title III provisions.66 The Eleventh
57. Id. at 1008-9.
58. Id. at 1008-10.
59. Id. at 1011.
60. Id.
61. Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 612-13 (3d Cir. 1998).
62. Id.
63. Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1114-15 (9th Cir.
2000) (citing Parker, 121 F.3d at 1010-11; Ford, 145 F.3d at 612-13).
64. Rendon v. Valleycrest Prods., Ltd., 294 F.3d 1279 (1 th Cir. 2002).
65. Id. at 1281.
66. Id.
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Circuit reversed the district court, however, reasoning that the theater was a
place of public accommodation, and the telephone selection process
provided the means to access the theater.67 The Eleventh Circuit was not
persuaded by the defendants' arguments that Title III's definition of
discrimination only contemplated physical bars to access and not "off-site
discrimination. 68 The court held that, because there is no such limiting
statutory language, and the requisite nexus was provided between the
theater and the allegedly discriminatory phone service, the case could move
forward.
69
C. The Americans with Disabilities Act and Web Sites
After the above cases, the circuits stood split on the definition of
"place of public accommodation" and whether it can encompass places that
are not physical structures. The First Circuit has held that the definition is
inclusive of nonphysical places, and the Seventh Circuit has agreed, at least
in dicta. The Third, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, however, apply the
"nexus test" to determine if the discriminatory product or service bears a
relationship to a concrete, physical structure within the statutory definition
of "place of public accommodation."
The first case to test Title III's application to Web sites was the
Eleventh Circuit case Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines Co. 70 The
Eleventh Circuit dismissed the claim raised by the plaintiff, Access Now,
who argued that the defendant, Southwest Airlines, discriminated against
blind persons by neither providing compatibility with accessibility
software-screen readers-nor optimizing the "virtual ticket counter" on
its Web site for use by blind customers. 71 The district court originally
dismissed the claim as it focused entirely on the application of Title III to
Southwest Airlines's Web site as a place of public accommodation.72
According to the district court, "the plain and unambiguous language of the
statute and relevant regulations does [sic] not include Internet websites
among the definitions of 'places of public accommodation.' 73 The district
court then applied the "nexus test" and determined that no nexus was
established between Southwest.com and a physical structure because the
plaintiffs never attempted to argue such a connection existed.74
67. Id. at 1284-85.
68. Id. at 1285.
69. Id. at 1283-84.
70. Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1325 (11 th Cir. 2004).
71. Id. at 1325-26.
72. Id. at 1325.
73. Id. at 1328 (quoting Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 227 F. Supp. 2d 1312,




On appeal, the plaintiffs no longer argued that Southwest Airlines's
Web site was a place of public accommodation, and instead argued that
Southwest Airlines provided a "travel service," which falls under the
statutory definition of "place of public accommodation., 75 Therefore, the
plaintiffs alleged, Southwest Airlines discriminated against blind persons
by not making its Web site accessible, as a service, to them.76 Because the
plaintiffs no longer argued their original theory on appeal, the court treated
the original theory as abandoned and, due to appellate procedure, would not
address the new theory.77 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the appeal
and the district court's ruling stood affirmed.78
The National Federation of the Blind (NFB) fared much better in a
similar case against Target Corporation. 79 The NFB filed suit in the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California, within the Ninth
Circuit, alleging that Target Corporation's Web site, Target.com,
discriminated against blind persons by not providing for compatibility with
screen readers.80 In a victory for disability advocates, the claim was not
dismissed as it was in Access Now.
However, despite allowing the cause of action, the decision denying
the motion to dismiss reaffirmed the court's adherence to a definition of
"place of public accommodation" that includes only brick-and-mortar
structures, and analysis under the nexus test. 81 The court's denial of the
motion hinged on "off-site discrimination"-that is, Title III bars
discrimination on the basis of disability "in the full and equal enjoyment of
the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations of
[as opposed to in] any place of public accommodation., 82 The court viewed
the Target Web site as an extension of Target's stores and agreed with the
plaintiffs insofar as "the inaccessibility of Target.com denies the blind the
ability to enjoy the services of Target stores. 83 However, the court held
that "[t]o the extent that Target.com offers information and services
unconnected to Target stores, which do not affect the enjoyment of goods
and services offered in Target stores, the plaintiffs fail to state a claim
under Title III of the ADA."84
75. Id. at 1328-29.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1335.
78. Id.
79. See Duranske, supra note 1.
80. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind v. Target Corp., 452 F. Supp. 2d 946, 949-50 (N.D. Cal.
2006).
81. Id. at 952.
82. Id. at 953 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a)) (emphasis in original).
83. Id. at 955.
84. Id. at 956.
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The NFB case was recently settled out of court, so no new precedent
was set.85 However, most scholarship since the denial of the motion to
dismiss has concluded that the nexus test requires a Web site to have some
nexus to a physical structure that constitutes a place of public
accommodation under the twelve categories listed in 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)
in order to fall under the requirements of Title 111.86 As the nexus test
requires a discriminatory product or service to hold a nexus with some sort
of physical structure in order for Title III to apply, and the Carparts line of
decisions has only included Web sites as places of public accommodation
in dicta, it remains to be seen whether, or in what manner, the ADA will be
applied to the World Wide Web. Furthermore, because virtual worlds bear
no nexus at all with concrete structures constituting places of public
accommodation, the ADA's application to virtual worlds is even trickier.
IV. BEYOND THE NEXUS TEST: RECENT ARGUMENTS FOR THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT'S APPLICABILITY TO THE
INTERNET
The nexus test's reliance on notions of physical place categorically
excludes the majority of online commerce, as Web sites like eBay.com and
Amazon.com have no nexus with a concrete place of public
accommodation. However, both constructions of "place of public
accommodation" present a problem for virtual worlds. Those circuits which
require a nexus between physical places of public accommodation and
discriminatory access will immediately dismiss an action against a virtual
world as lacking any nexus with a concrete physical structure enumerated
by the statute. Virtual worlds are computer programs created by game
developers, and game-development companies do not fit any of the twelve
statutory categories. Even under the broad definition provided by the First
and Seventh Circuits, a distinction remains between a business providing
reasonable access to its products and services, and a business altering its
products and services to accommodate people with disabilities.87 Because
of this distinction, even if game-development companies or ISPs are an
eligible category under Title III, their products may not be subject to it.
85. Duranske, supra note 1.
86. Shani Else, Note, Courts Must Welcome the Reality of the Modern World:
Cyberspace Is a Place Under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 65 WASH. &
LEEL. REV. 1121, 1141 (2008).
87. See, e.g., Parker, 121 F.3d at 1012 ("The applicable regulations clearly set forth
that Title III regulates the availability of the goods and services the place of public
accommodation offers as opposed to the contents of goods and services offered by the
public accommodation."); Mutual of Omaha, 179 F.3d at 560 ("The common sense of the
statute is that the content of the goods or services offered by a place of public
accommodation is not regulated.").
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Two recent student publications have argued that the nexus test is
incorrect and should be abolished, but each is problematic for the purposes
of virtual worlds. Shani Else's note, published in the Summer 2008
Washington and Lee Law Review, argues that all of "cyberspace" should be
considered a "place" under Title 111.88 Nikki D. Kessling's note, published
in the 2008 Houston Law Review, also argues that the nexus test should be
abandoned, but provides an alternative "commerce- and character-based"
analysis.89
A. "Cyberspace " as a "Place of Public Accommodation"
In her note, Courts Must Welcome the Reality of the Modern World:
Cyberspace Is a Place Under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities
Act, Else argues that "[t]he [I]nternet is designed to be used as a place, is
used as a place, and individuals think of the [1]nternet as a place," and, thus
courts, must follow suit and recognize the Internet as a place of public
accommodation." However, Else's definition paints with a rather broad
stroke and is prone to failure if applied generally.
The Internet is a medium of communication, and "cyberspace" is
difficult to define. Does the definition of "cyberspace" include the entire
Internet, or just the World Wide Web? The note does not expressly provide
the answer, and Else fails to demonstrate a clear understanding of the
subject matter. For instance, Else uses words like "Internet," "World Wide
Web," "online," and "cyberspace" interchangeably.9' The World Wide
Web is only part of the Internet, however, and many aspects of the Internet
are not at all recognizable as "places." While Web sites inherently may
evoke ideas of place ("site" is even included in the word), other Internet-
based services, such as instant-messaging services, e-mail, Internet relay
chat channels, and VoIP telephone services do not evoke the same feelings
of "place" that Web sites do. Should courts define e-mail, or e-mail clients
such as Microsoft Outlook or Mozilla Thunderbird, as places of public
accommodation? Else seems to believe they should not, as the note
provides, "[a] television broadcast, insurance, or a telephone is not
designed, used, or perceived as a place. 92
Despite the vagueness of Else's definition of "cyberspace," the
virtual-world-as-place argument has some elemental appeal. Once Else
establishes that "cyberspace" is "designed, used, and perceived as a
88. Else, supra note 87, at 1124.
89. Kessling, supra note 18, at 1024.
90. Else, supra note 8, at 1124.
91. Seeid. at 1122, 1125.
92. Id. at 1145.
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place," 93 she analogizes treating cyberspace legally as a place in the same
way that, she argues, in Marsh v. Alabama, the Supreme Court treated a
privately owned city as a public municipality because it was designed and
used as a public municipality. 94
If Else's analogy holds, when applied specifically to virtual worlds,
the analogy could be even stronger. In fact, VirtuallyBlind.com, a disability
advocacy blog, argued that the similarities between the real world and
three-dimensional virtual worlds may allow for persuasive arguments that
virtual worlds are, or at least provide, places of public accommodation.95
Many virtual worlds contain buildings that serve as meeting places, retail
stores, educational facilities, virtual zoos, inns, and auction houses, among
other things. Second Life contains storefronts for real-world companies like
American Apparel, BMW, Dell Computer, Toyota, Sprint, Reebok, and
many others.96 As previously mentioned, Second Life also sells virtual real
estate and maintains virtual currency on an exchange with real-world
currency. There is no question that a virtual world is designed, used, and
perceived as a place. Furthermore, if the private ownership of a city was no
hindrance to the application of federal law in Marsh v. Alabama, then Title
III should apply to virtual worlds despite private developers' ownership.
However, Else again paints with too broad of a stroke. In Marsh v.
Alabama, it was not merely that the privately owned city was designed,
used, and perceived as a public city, but that, notwithstanding its
ownership, the privately owned city was in all meaningful ways the same
as a public municipality. 97 For that reason, the Supreme Court determined
that the state could not allow the privately owned city to violate
fundamental rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court
did not go so far as to find that the privately owned city was legally a
public municipality.98 It is not clear that de facto denials of access to a
virtual world infringe any fundamental rights under the First or Fourteenth
Amendments.
Moreover, even if courts did extend this line of reasoning to
encompass virtual worlds, it is likely that Title HI would apply only in a
piecemeal fashion to those virtual structures that have real world analogues
fitting one of the twelve categories defined by Title III. Disability
advocates seek to apply Title III to more than just certain stores in Second
Life. Virtual worlds consist of more than buildings and walkways; indeed,
93. Id. at 1139.
94. Id. at 1147 (citing Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946)).
95. See Duranske, supra note 1.
96. Davidson, supra note 13, at 681.
97. 326 U.S. 501, 508 (1948).
98. Id. at 508-09.
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they are entire worlds, which are not covered per se by Title III. Virtual
worlds cannot-under Marsh or the current split in precedent among the
circuit courts-fall under Title III.
B. The Commerce- and Character-Based Test
Kessling's note, titled Why the Target "Nexus Test" Leaves Disabled
Americans Disconnected: A Better Approach to Determine Whether
Private Commercial Websites Are "Places of Public Accommodation," like
Else's, argues that Web sites should be analyzed as "'places of public
accommodation' in their own right," but does not define them as places
categorically.99 Instead, Kessling's test focuses on the commerciality and
character of a Web site to determine if it will fall under the provisions of
Title III. 'i Like Else's analogy, this test has some appeal for virtual
worlds, but is problematic and may require tweaking in order to apply it
properly.
According to Kessling, the first step of the test requires that the Web
site "affect interstate commerce in some way," as required by Title HI, and
be a private entity.' 0' This threshold step, Kessling argues, would "rule out
the myriad websites that do not actually engage in commercial activity"
and exclude per se those Web sites that neither sell products or services nor
charge membership fees.'02 Almost all virtual-world developers would pass
this threshold step because the bulk of all massively multiplayer online
role-playing game (MMORPG) developers charge for the software content
of their game-including subscription fees for access-and many of the
remaining virtual-world services sell products within their world.
The second step requires an analysis of the character of the
commercial entity and its resemblance to any of the twelve enumerated
categories of places of public accommodation under Title 111.103 Kessling
lists several Web sites and how they might fit the categories; for example,
Amazon.com is a "sales or rental establishment" and Games.yahoo.com is
a "place of recreation.'1°4
The reach of the second step may be broad or narrow when applied to
virtual worlds. Broadly, it may be argued that a virtual world like Second
Life is at least a "place of public gathering" under the statute, or that a
virtual world like World of Warcraft is a "place of entertainment."
Alternatively, the second step may narrowly reach only those elements
99. Kessling, supra note 18, at 1024.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1025.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1025-26.
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within virtual worlds that closely resemble one of the categories under Title
III, like an in-world auction house or retail establishment. The latter is too
narrow because mandated access to an in-world retail establishment will
not ameliorate those problems of access to the world in general. The reach
of the former definition, however, may be too broad, as virtual worlds are
commercial products and Title III explicitly exempts products themselves
from its purview; it is the access to products that concerns the statute. °5
This remains problematic so long as the virtual world itself is the product,
but, as virtual worlds begin to become merely the platform for products
sold, concerns about access to those products begin to have more legal
weight. For this reason, it is necessary to distinguish between virtual worlds
as products themselves and virtual worlds as platforms for the sale of goods
and services.
C. Regulating Virtual Worlds as Platforms
Professor Edward Castronova offers a way to distinguish virtual
worlds that may provide assistance in applying the "commerce and
character test" proposed by Kessling: a dichotomy between "open" and
"closed" worlds. 10 6 This dichotomy may not map perfectly on top of the
virtual-world-as-product and virtual-world-as-platform dichotomy but, for
the purposes of analysis, it provides a reasonable analogy.
According to Castronova, "closed" worlds are those in which the
"border between the [virtual] world[s] and the real world is considered
impermeable" and user interests are regulated by the terms of the End User
License Agreement (EULA) between the developers and the users.107 These
"closed" worlds are games that attempt to remain unadulterated by real-
world interests.' 0 8 Most virtual worlds are sold as, and intended to be,
computer games, like World of Warcraft, Dark Age of Camelot, Everquest,
City of Heroes, and so on. These games have stories with fixed beginnings
for entering players, and fixed endings with several intermediate, and often
optional, missions or quests between them. To assist the player and provide
incentive to complete missions or quests, these games offer progressively
better virtual equipment with which to outfit their avatars when players
defeat monsters or complete quests. Acquiring this virtual property often
requires a great deal of time, and some of it is more rare and more powerful
than other virtual property, so enterprising players have begun selling it on
105. Mutual of Omaha, 179 F.3d at 560.
106. Edward Castronova, The Right to Play, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 185, 201-02 (2004).
107. Id. at201.
108. See id. at 201-02.
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Internet auction sites like eBay to players who have the money, but not the
time, to invest in acquiring it.'0 9
However, such external sales are most often expressly prohibited by
the game's EULA.t10 Because of this, while virtual products are bought and
sold in these "closed" worlds, the virtual-world providers are not using the
virtual world as a platform for the sale of virtual goods. No real-world
money is intended to exchange hands for the purchase of virtual property;
instead, it is meant to be kept in-game. To some extent, imposing the
terrestrial law on these games would be tantamount to prosecuting a
football player who tackles another player or a boxer who hits another
boxer for assault and battery.
In contrast to "closed" worlds, Castronova describes "open" worlds as
providing a porous border between the real and virtual worlds such that the
"interests and conditions of users are regulated by applicable real-world
law."' 11' "Open" worlds, in effect, are those virtual worlds that allow real-
world interests, such as real-world currency, to permeate them. In these
worlds, the sale of virtual goods and services for real currency may be
commonplace and, thus, can be said to be platforms for the sale of products
and services.
A good example of such an "open" world is Second Life. Linden
Labs, the company that created and maintains Second Life, released a
development kit for Second Life and allowed its users to create the world-
buildings, clothing, landscapes, and all. 1 2 While the Second Life software
is free, Second Life has its own in-world currency, called Linden Dollars,
and maintains a currency exchange between its currency and real-world
currency. 13 It also sells virtual real estate, and collects ongoing fees, like a
tax, for the ownership and maintenance of this virtual land. 14 Eventually,
Linden Labs allowed its users to maintain intellectual property rights in
their in-game creations,115 creating a property interest that must be
109. Since 2007, eBay has delisted all such virtual-property auctions. Posting by Zonk,
Slashdot.org, http://games.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=07/01/26/2026257 (Jan. 26, 2007
03:39 PM EST). However, auction Web sites still exist to sell virtual world property and
accounts. See, e.g., MMOBay.net, http://www.mmobay.net/ (last visited Dec. 10, 2009);
BuyMMOAccounts.com, http://www.buymmoaccounts.com/ (last visited Dec. 10, 2009).
110. See, e.g., WoW Terms of Use (2)(B), http://www.worldofwarcraft.com/legal/
termsofuse.html ("You agree that you will not, under any circumstances ... exploit the
Game or any of its parts ... for gathering in-game currency, items or resources for sale
outside of the Game.") (last visited Dec. 10, 2009).
111. Castronova, supra note 107, at 202.
112. Davidson, supra note 13, at 680.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 680-81. See also, Second Life Land FAQ, http://secondlife.comland/faq/ (last
visited Dec. 10, 2009).
115. Id. at690-91.
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protected, which could ultimately lead to the possibility of government
intervention in the handling of disputes.'
6
As Second Life is a free service, its sale of virtual products for real
money-or at least for virtual money that has a direct exchange rate for real
money-makes it a platform for the sale of products. This "platform"
affects interstate commerce and, under Kessling's commerce and character
test, may be characterized as a "place," in particular a "service
establishment" akin to a real-estate agency. Similarly situated "open"
worlds may be argued comparably as "places" under Title III.
V. CONCLUSION
The Internet, and in particular virtual worlds, provides innumerable
opportunities for people with disabilities to enjoy their lives independently,
by increasing their social interaction, self-worth, and self-reliance. More
than that, virtual worlds provide an opportunity for individuals, disabled or
not, to experience a virtual life unhindered by social stigma or physical
disability. Because virtual worlds provide a unique opportunity to take
reprieve from real-world hindrances, those individuals with the greatest
obstacles to everyday life stand to benefit the most from the experience
virtual worlds offer.
As such, it is imperative that we reexamine accessibility jurisprudence
to build and maintain a bridge between the real and virtual worlds for
disabled individuals. The Americans with Disabilities Act was intended to
level the playing field for opportunities among people despite their
disabilities. However, because of its passage prior to the growth of the
Internet, its provisions do not contemplate online commerce. Advances in
Internet technology that could most benefit people with disabilities, such as
virtual worlds, are accessible only at the whim of developers.
So long as courts hang on to the "nexus test" or notions of "place"
that require concrete, physical structures, people with disabilities will be
denied opportunity in virtual worlds. Adopting a new notion of "place,"
which looks to the character of the virtual world, may ameliorate this, but
courts will need to be educated about such similarities to real world places
in order to advance the cause of people with disabilities as intended by the
Americans with Disabilities Act.
116. Indeed, the State already has intervened against a virtual world that denied access to
one of its virtual property owners, ruling clauses of the terms of use to be contracts of
adhesion. See Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
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